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Abstract: This article studies U.S. views of the historical relationship between the 
U.S. and Europe as conceived during the 20th century. This is examined through U.S. 
World history text books dating from 1921 to 2001. The textbooks view relations within 
a gene ral teleolo gical nar rative of progress through democracy and technology. Gen-
erally, the textbooks stress the significan ce of the English heritage to American soci-
ety. From the American Revolution on wards, how ever, the U.S. stands as an example 
to Europe. Beginning with the two world wars, it also intervenes directly in Europe in 
order to save democracy. In the Cold War, the U.S. finally acknowledges the lea ding 
role it has been assigned in the world. Through its democratic ideals, the U.S. histo-
rically has a spe cial relationship with Great Britain and, by the 20th century, Western 
Europe in gene ral. An American identity is established both in conjunction with West-
ern Europe, by empha sizing their common democratic tradition, and in opposition 
to it, by stressing how the Ameri cans have developed this tradition better than the 
Europeans, creating a more egalitarian and libertarian society. There is a need for 
Europe to become more like the U.S., and a Europe that does not follow the American 
lead is viewed with suspicion.
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There has been some debate on the development of the relationship be-
tween the United States of America and its European allies after the end 
of the Cold War, especially in connection with the Iraq war of 2003. The 
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American invasion of Iraq drew criticism from many Europe ans for be-
ing irresponsible, whilst many Americans labeled Europeans, the French 
in particu lar, as ungrateful and cowardly. Some scholars even spoke of a 
new “anti-Europeanism” in the USA, corresponding to the more well-es-
tablished concept of “anti-Americanism”.1
In my view, such images and attitudes are not inconsequential. Even as-
suming that states and nations are governed by their interests, these inter-
ests are not given by nature but must be constructed and defined by some 
agents. Identity is essential; before we know who we are, we cannot know 
what our interests are. We can interpret the world around us in different 
ways, depending on our perceptions of ourselves and others and, not least, 
our historical culture. Arguably, U.S. foreign policy has been strongly in-
fluenced by specific enemy images. I work from a constructivist perspective 
stressing the importance of factors such as identity, ideology and historical 
consciousness of international relations.2 
American attitudes to Europe might be better understood in a historical 
con text. This in cludes “anti-Europeanism”, if there is such a thing; for even 
though it may have its main caus es in contemporary politics, it makes use 
of metaphors and conceptions that have a history. The question therefore is, 
how have Americans conceived of their relationship with Europe? To some 
extent this also involves images of Europe more generally, but as I have writ-
ten on this elsewhere,3 I will here particularly focus on the American view of 
its relations to Europe and European countries. Of course, images of Europe 
and its place in the world will influence how American-European relations 
are conceived, and consequently they, too, will be dis cus sed here to some 
extent. But the main focus is not on American images of Europe in gene ral 
but on the roles America and Europe are thought to have played in relation to 
each other—not in relation to others—and to their dealings with each other. 
1 Timothy Garton Ash, ”The New Anti-Europeanism in America”, in Tod Lindberg (ed.), Beyond Paradise 
and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Relationship, New York: Routledge, 2005.
2 Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty 
Years War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996; David Campbell, Writing Security: United 
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998; Richard 
Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Global Order, London: Routledge 
2003, pp. 8-38; Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultu ral Theory of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008.
3 Martin Alm, “Europe in American World History Textbooks,” forthcoming in Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies.
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There is a consi derable body of scholarly work on European images of 
America but far less on American images of Europe. There are some stud-
ies on American relations with speci fic European countries, often focusing 
on diplomatic, military and commercial relations,4 but there are few studies 
that take a more comprehensive view of American images of Europe. In a 
short 1960 essay, Daniel Boorstin sketches such an image and maintains 
that it was structur ed by the idea of Europe as the antithesis of the United 
States; Europe was marked by poverty, repres sion and deca dence, whereas 
the USA was affluent, free and vigorous. After the First World War, Ameri-
cans set out to transform Europe in their own image.5 In a larger study from 
1963, Cushing Strout invest igates American attitudes to Europe from the 
American Revolution to the post war era and ar rives at findings similar to 
Boorstin’s: the USA and Europe have con sistently been positioned as each 
other’s opposites, with Europe as an ancient site of the past and the USA as 
the youthful promised land of the future.6 In a later study, John Lamberton 
Harper explores the ideas of Europe in three politically influential 20th-
century Americans and finds a funda mental ambi valence which, according 
to him, is representative of the USA at large. Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted 
to dismantle European imperialism and world dominance without the USA 
being for ced to assume a leading international role; George F. Kennan wan-
ted a strong Europe that would render American internationalism unneces-
sary; and Dean Acheson vacil lated between trying to control Europe and 
making it stand on its own legs.7
There are some other studies which touch upon American attitudes to 
Europe in general. They find that Americans tended to associate Europe 
with inequality, war and secret diploma cy and tried, until the late 19th centu-
ry, to keep aloof from them politically. By 1900, there was a rapprochement 
between the USA and Great Britain, emphasizing commona lities of cul ture 
and political tradition, “Anglo-Saxonism”. Suspicion of the British “class 
4 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretative History, New York: 
Wiley, 1978; Hans Gatzke, Germany and the United Staes: A “Special Relationship?”, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1980; David Dimbledy & David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship 
Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, New York, Vintage Books, 1988.
5 Daniel J. Boorstin, “America and the Image of Europe”, in America and the Image of Europe: Reflections 
on American Thought, New York: Meridian Books, 1960, pp. 19-39.
6 Cushing Strout, The American Image of the Old World, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
7 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean 
Acheson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
98 American Studies in Scandinavia, 44:2
system” linger ed on, however. After the two world wars, the Americans at-
tempted to remold Europe and create a new, liberal world order.8 This also 
largely applies to the attitudes in American history text books in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries.9
Material
In order to access somewhat more basic American attitudes to Europe 
than those ex pressed in current political debate, I have studied a number 
of American textbooks in World History from 1921 to 2001. My starting 
point is that the images of the past presented in histo ry text books influen ce 
people’s identities and, to some extent, also their relations to other peo ples 
and states. Textbooks are both cause and effect. They are products of the 
cultural identities, values and specific power relations in a society, which 
determine what is to be written in them. At the same time, they are also a 
power in themsel ves, as they in their turn influ ence people and so cieties. 
They may be said to express the self-image of their society and to largely 
mirror knowledge and values that are taken for granted there. They both fol-
low from and constitute part of a society’s historical culture, i.e., the ways 
wherein history is commu nicated in that so ciety and the conditions—the in-
struments, contexts and norms—under which this takes place.10 Thus, text-
books may be expected both to repeat existing images and ideas of Europe 
8 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914, New York: At-
eneum, 1968, pp. 6, 8, 79f; N. Gordon Levin, jr, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response 
to War and Revolution, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 2-4, 37-41; David Reynolds, The 
Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study in Com petitive Co-operation, London: Eu-
ropa Publications, 1981, pp. 23f; David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, 
Marshall, MacArthur—The Generation That Changed America’s Role in the World, Basingstoke: MacMil-
lan 1995, pp. 19, 66-71, 74. 
9 Ruth Miller Elson, “American Schoolbooks and ‘Culture’ in the Nineteenth Century”, Mississippi Valley 
Histo rical Review, vol. 46: 3 (1959), pp. 420, 426, 434; Joseph Moreau, Schoolbook Nation: Conflicts over 
American History Textbooks from the Civil War to the Present, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2004, pp. 102-106, 134, 178f, 182f. 
10 Keith Crawford, “Researching the Ideological and Political Role of the History Textbook—Issues and 
Me thods”, in International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research, vol. 1 (2000), p. 1; 
Klas-Göran Karlsson, ”The Holocaust as a Problem of Historical Culture: Theoretical and Analytical Chal-
lenges”, in Klas-Göran Karlsson & Ulf Zander (eds.), Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in 
Contemporary Europe, Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003, pp. 30-38; Niklas Ammert, ”Om läroböcker 
och studiet av dem”, in Niklas Ammert (ed.), Att spegla världen. Läromedelsstudier i teori och praktik, 
Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, p. 32. 
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and of American-European relations and to affect these images and ideas. 
This ma kes them a relevant source material for a study such as this one. To 
assess the impact of textbooks on students more precisely is difficult; but 
at least they seem still to be very impor tant to the teaching of history in 
American schools.11
In the USA, World History is a one-year course in high school, intro-
duced in the wake of the American entrance into the First World War in 
1917. The course long stressed Western history and became more global 
in character only in the 1970s. The course is usually optional, in contrast 
with the courses in American history.12 There are few studies that have been 
based on World History textbooks. Still, in exploring U.S. images of the 
world over time, they are a more obvious choice than American history 
textbooks, where, according to Frances FitzGe rald, references to the rest 
of the world and even to American foreign relations are sparse be fore the 
1950s.13 
Normally, textbooks are governed by a textbook tradition, which leads 
them to change rela tively slowly. However, Janne Holmén has found Nor-
wegian, Swedish, and Fin nish textbooks from the cold war era to be fairly 
sensitive to po litical changes in society. This was true of social science text-
books more than of history textbooks, though, and of contempo rary history 
more than of older history.14
A final note should be made on the conditions of the U.S. textbook mar-
ket. About half of the American states apply state adoption, which means 
that a list of textbooks that schools may choose from is made on the state 
level. The other states leave this decision to the indi vidual school districts. 
11 Marvin Herschel Berman, The Treatment of the Soviet Union and Communism in Selected World History 
Textbooks, 1920-1970, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976, p. 24; Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai & 
Stanley Rothman, Molding the Good Citizen: The Politics of High School History Texts, Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 1995, pp. 152f; Gilbert T. Sewall, “World History Textbooks: A Review”, A Report of the Ameri-
can Textbook Council, New York, 2004, p. 17.
12 Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree & Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the 
Past, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, pp. 207-211; M. Berman, pp. 2, 65.
13 Frances FitzGerald, America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century, Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1979, pp. 128f. 
14 Crawford, p. 1. Klas-Göran Karlsson, ”Läroboken och makten—ett komplicerat förhållande”, in Niklas 
Am mert (ed.), Att spegla världen. Läromedelsstudier i teori och praktik, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, pp. 
46, 49f; Sture Lång ström, Författarröst och läro bokstradition. En historiedidaktisk studie, Umeå: Umeå 
University, 1997, 210, 213; Janne Holmén, Den politiska läroboken. Bilden av USA och Sovjetunionen i 
norska, svenska och fin ländska läroböcker under Kalla kriget, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2006, pp. 325, 
328-330.
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Textbook publishers have therefore had to adapt to states with differ ing 
agendas by analyzing the demands of the states, the tests given to the stu-
dents and the ex pectations of teachers and school leaders. This makes them 
sensitive to political pressure.15 Accordingly, although it is not possible to 
find out which textbooks have been most widely used, it seems unlikely 
that there would be any dramatic differences between general text books at 
any given time. Textbooks aimed at the public educational system would 
scarcely depart much from mainstream views. I have also tried to use text-
books from well-established pu blishing houses, and for textbooks pub-
lished before 1970, I have mostly relied on Marvin Berman’s The Treatment 
of the Soviet Union, whe re he uses books reported to have had “fair ly wide 
usage”.16 The chosen time-frame for this study, 1921 to 2001, is motivated 
by the in troduction of the World History course following the First World 
War and by the Iraq War in 2003. 
Background: Narrative Themes and Focus
I have found that a consistent dominant theme in European history as pre-
sented by Ame rican World History textbooks during the whole period of 
study is the development of demo cracy, defined as government by the con-
sent of the governed and as individual freedom of choice. The entire history 
of Europe is framed by this basic plot.17 A second important theme in most 
15 Ian Westbury, ”Textbooks, Textbook Publishers, and the Quality of Schooling”, in David L. Elliot & Ar-
thur Woodward (eds.), Textbooks and Schooling in the United States, Chicago, 1990, pp. 2, 8, 13; James 
R. Squire & Richard T. Morgan, “The Elementary and High School Textbook Market Today,” in Elliot & 
Woodward (eds.), pp. 115, 119f; Sewall, pp. 12f. 
16 M. Berman, pp. 11f.
17 See e.g. Hutton Webster, World History, Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1921, pp. 82, 265, 272, 282, 290, 
358-361, 410-412, 478, 623; Edwin G. Pahlow, Man’s Great Adventure: An Introduction to World History, 
Boston: Ginn & Co., 1932, pp. 166, 494, 502, 558-561, 574f, 581, 593, 665, 692f, 828-830; Lester B. Rog-
ers, Fay Adams & Walker Brown, Story of Nations, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940, pp. 106, 112f, 178, 
319f, 323-325, 361-364, 389, 400f, 653f, 656, 697, 716, 726-728; Carl Becker, Sidney Painter & Yu-Shan 
Han, The Past that Lives Today, New York: Silver Burdett Co., 1952, pp. 4f, 56, 147, 222, 250-252, 348, 
422, 464, 487, 500, 733f; A. Wesley Roehm, Morris R. Buske, Hutton Webster & Edgar B. Wesley, The 
Record of Mankind, Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1965, pp. 44, 48, 146, 180, 244, 257, 306-308, 480; Daniel 
Roselle, Our Common Heritage: A World History, Lexington: Ginn & Co., 1984, pp. 80, 269, 341, 344, 
350-352, 398; William Travis Hanes III (ed.), World His tory: Continuity & Change, Austin: Holt, Rinehart 
& Winston, 1999, pp. 397, 451, 718, 844; Mounir A. Farah & Andrea Berens Karls, World History: The 
Human Experience, New York: Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, 2001, pp. 101-103, 119, 310, 419, 525, 530, 534, 
542, 568, 648, 1022.
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of the books is the evolution of modern science and technology, giving 
mankind increasing mastery over nature and furthering democracy by ha-
bituating people to free and ra tional thought.18 Thus, the historical narrative 
largely assumes a teleological character, depic ting democracy’s triumph in 
its struggle with the forces of darkness. The heroes are mostly middle class, 
scientists and liberal reformers (Gladstone, Wilson); the villains are auto-
cratic monarchs, entrenched aristo cracies and orthodox religion, to some 
extent the extreme radi cals, and, of late, also the totalitarian dictators (Louis 
XIV, Metternich, Hitler, Stalin).19
Until the 1970s, the focus of World History textbooks is clearly on Eu-
rope; other parts of the world mostly become of interest mainly in relation 
to Europe. It is Western civilization that is the driving force of progress in 
the world, and this civilization has its roots in Wes tern Europe. Oftentimes 
the concept of “Europe” in practice stands for Wes tern Europe, whilst East-
ern Europe is left out.20 This is not always the case, however. The differ-
ence between Western and Eastern Europe is explained by the religious and 
18 See e.g. Pahlow, 1932, pp. 528f, 568-571, 587f, 617; Rogers et al., 1940, pp. 277, 403f; Walter Wall bank & 
Alastair M. Taylor, Civilization: Past and Present, Published for the United States Armed forces by Scott, 
foresman & Co., 1944, vol,. I, pp. 368, 371, and vol. II, pp. 37-43, 48-57, 186-191; Becker et al., pp. 264, 
328, 430f, 532; Emma Peters Smith, David Saville Muzzey & Minnie Lloyd, World History: The Struggle 
for Civilization, Boston: Ginn & Co., 1952, pp. 487-498; Nataniel Platt & Muriel J. Drummond, Our World 
through the Ages, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959, pp. 222-228, 516f; Hanes (ed.), pp. 402-409, 
457; Farah & Karls, pp. 521, 626-628. 
19 See e.g. Webster, pp. 176, 297, 364; Henry W. Elson, Modern Times and the Living Past, New York: Ameri-
can Book Co., 1928, pp. 247, 407, 433ff; James Harvey Robinson & Emma Peters Smith, Our World today 
and Yes terday: A History of Modern Civilization, Boston: Ginn & Co., 1932, pp. 205-208, 255f, 258, 273; 
Pahlow, 1932, pp. 625-630; R. O. Hughes, The Making of Today’s World, Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1937, 
p. 371, 481; Smith et al., pp. 1, 129, 196, 245-248, 280; Becker et al., pp. 223-228, 264; William Habber-
ton & Lawrence V. Roth, Man’s Achievements through the Ages, New York: Laidlaw Brothers, 1956, pp. 
222, 258, 326, 328f, 387; Platt & Drum mond, pp. 135, 252, 264-266, 271, 288-290, 298;  F. Kenneth Cox, 
Miriam Greenblatt & Stanley Seaberg, Hu man Heritage: A World History, Columbus: Charles E. Merill 
Publishing Co., 1981, pp. 347; Sol Holt & John R. Connor, Exploring World History: A Global Approach 
Ages, New York: Globe Book Company, 1983, pp. 257, 262, 351f, 492, 568; Ro sel le, pp. 267, 318, 341, 
368; Larry S. Krieger, Kenneth Neill & Steven L. Jantzen, World History: Perspectives on the Past, Lex-
ington. Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1992, p. 697; Elisabeth Gaynor Ellis & Anthony Esler, World History: 
Connections to Today, Upper Saddle river, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1999, p. 469; Hanes (ed.), pp. 390, 462f; 
Farah & Karls, pp. 302, 480, 493, 560. 
20 Webster, pp. 540; Pahlow, 1932, pp. 398f, 741; Hughes, pp. 367, 369; Wallbank & Taylor, p. 32; Edwin 
G. Pahlow, Man’s Great Adventure: An Introduction to World History, Boston: Ginn & Co., 1949, p. 525f; 
Becker et al., pp. v, 173, 318, 821f; Smith et al., p. vif, 283, Habberton & Roth, pp. 218; 549; Lester B. 
Rogers, Fay Adams & Walker Brown, Story of Nations, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960, p. 218; 
Holt & O’Connor, p. 549. Hanes (ed.), pp. 360, 418; Farah & Karls, pp. 292, 316.
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cultural split between Rome and Byzantium, separating Russia and much 
of Eastern Europe from the Wes tern sphere. Whether Russia is a part of 
Europe or not is unclear.21
In many cases, rather than speaking of Europe or Western Europe, the 
textbooks prefer speaking of the West, which includes not only Western 
Europe but Anglo-America, Australia and New Zealand as well. This is 
particularly common after the Second World War, although the concept of 
the West is present already in Hutton Webster’s 1921 textbook, and Edwin 
Pah low in 1932 speaks of “Euro-America” in the same sense.22 The West is 
not primarily a geo graphic but a cultural concept, representing the values of 
democracy, individualism, rationa lity and technology—in short, of moder-
nity, more or less as conceived by classic moderniza tion theory. 
When, starting in the 1970s, the overall focus of the World History text-
books changes to devote considerably more space to the historical societies 
and cultures of Asia, Africa and South America, European his tory is no lon-
ger identified with world history, which means that less prominence is given 
to “western” topics. Yet, in those parts of the textbooks that continue to deal 
with European history, the ba sic historical framing remains the same. 
America and Europe
As American history is a subject with its own, mandatory courses, the USA 
is mostly men tioned only peripherally in the World History books; when it 
is mentioned, it is due to its dealings and relations with other parts of the 
world or, occasionally, its being an integrated part of Western civilization 
and its evolution. In addition, some of the books are fond of com paring 
or contrasting other cultures in history with the American society of their 
own day. The USA figures above all in connection with English and British 
history, the American Revolu tion, the two world wars and the Cold War. 
Before the 20th century, it mostly stands aloof from the events of Euro pean 
history as presented in the textbooks. 
21 Elson, p. 612; Pahlow, 1932, p. 588; Robinson & Smith, p. 213; Hughes, p. 519; Rogers et al., 1940, p. 
88; Habberton & Roth, p. 367; Platt & Drummond, p. 276f; Roehm et al., p. 228; Cox, p. 296, 333, 336; 
Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 448; Ellis & Esler, pp. 246, 248; Hanes (ed.), p. 239f; Farah & Karls, pp. 262f, 
498. 
22 Webster, pp. 89, 179; Pahlow, 1932, pp. v, and 1949, p. 13; Becker et al., pp. v, 5, 56f, 539, 803f; Smith et 
al., pp. vi, 2; Habberton & Roth, pp. 14, 69, 163, 577, 765; Rogers et al., 1960, pp. 71, 168, 209f; Roehm 
et al., pp. 38, 228; Cox et al., pp. 124, 180; Roselle, pp. 80, 342, 408; Hanes, pp. 77, 239f.
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America’s European Heritage: England and America
It is made clear that the United States has its roots in European civiliza-
tion, and particularly in English customs and traditions. By and large, the 
textbooks underline the cultural and consti tutional connections between 
England and the USA. Not only the English language and many English 
customs but also the English traditions of common law, the jury system 
and repre sentative government form parts of the American heritage. Magna 
Carta and the establishment of Parliament in 13th-century England are con-
sidered pivotal historical events, laying the foun dations of modern demo-
cracy. There is more or less a direct line from them to the poli tical sy stem 
of the United Sta tes. Englishmen “shaped Ameri can history before America 
was discov ered”.23 “Our belief that men should be governed by an orderly 
system of law—by laws that cannot be changed or ignored at the whim of an 
official—owes much to liberty-loving Eng lishmen who had fought for these 
ideas, even as long ago as the twelfth and thirteenth cen turies.”24
The next decisive step in the creation of this Anglo-American political 
heritage was the English revolu tion and civil war in the 1600s, where the 
textbooks side unequivocally with Parliament against the Stuart kings. The 
Petition of Right from 1628 and the Bill of Rights from 1689 are viewed 
as important precursors of the first ten amendments to the American con-
stitution.25  
If there is strong sympathy for the British political tradition, there is also, 
especially in the older textbooks, a marked dislike of what is perceived as a 
more rigid class system and social distinctions in Britain:  “In no other respect 
do the English differ so widely from us Ameri cans as in the caste system, 
from which we are happily free in this country.”26 Thus, the Bri tish political 
tradition is laudable, but the Americans have realized it better than the Eng-
lish themselves. If there is a discernible change of this theme over time, it is 
rather that this social criticism of Britain grows weaker in later textbooks, 
perhaps because of the closer relation ship between the two countries, or per-
haps in response to actual or perceived changes in Bri tish society. 
23 Becker et al., pp. 250f (quote on p. 250); Webster, p. 342; Hughes, pp. 275-284; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, 
p. 226; Smith et al., p. 149; Habberton & Roth, pp. 205, 305; Platt & Drummond, p. 3; Rogers et al., 1960, 
p. 262; Ellis & Esler, p. 403; Farah & Karls, p. 103. 
24 Becker et al., p. 250.
25 Habberton & Roth, p. 300; Rogers et al., 1960, p. 274; Roehm et al., p. 240; Ellis & Esler, p. 434.
26 Elson, p. 357.
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America’s Significance to Europe
The American Revolution: An Example to Europe and the World
By the late 18th century, Europe and America change places in the march 
towards freedom and democracy. The Americans now take the lead. Great 
Britain was the most democratic country in the Old World, according to the 
textbooks, but its Ame rican colonies were none theless ahead of it. In the 
colonies, there was no hereditary nobility, no great differ ences of wealth, 
and no established church. A larger proportion of the popu lation than in 
Bri tain had a say in the governing of society.27 In many ways the American 
rebels identified with and fought within an English tradition defending the 
rights of the common man. “It was only be cause they felt they were not 
granted the rights of Englishmen that they revolted and set up their own 
government.”28
But there were some important differences between the colonies and 
the mother country. Several textbooks, even newer ones, advance Freder-
ick Jackson Turner’s thesis of the demo cra tizing and nationalizing influ-
ence of the western frontier. Here, in the struggle to survive in an un tamed 
environ ment, a culture based on individual freedom and democracy took 
shape. Thus, there was a more radical desire for freedom in the colonies 
than in England itself. Their uni que experiences helped transform the colo-
nists from Englishmen or Europeans to Ameri cans. By the late 1700s, the 
colonies were ready to stand on their own legs.29 Even if this does not nec-
essarily contradict the importance of the English heritage, there is a certain 
tension be tween the two alleged roots of American democracy in the text-
books. 
A substantial part of the blame for the revolution is, however, assigned 
to King George III, “this would-be despot”, whose  measures to tax the 
colonies and control their trade to the ad vanta ge of the mother country are 
characterized as “foolish”, “selfish” and “oppressive”. The revo lution, it 
is asserted, also saved British parliamentarism by thwarting the king’s at-
tempts at recovering the powers of his office. It was a struggle between 
27 Pahlow, 1932, pp. 582f; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 367; Ellis & Esler, p. 470; Hanes, p. 464; Farah & 
Karls, pp. 546-548.
28 Rogers et al., 1940, p. 348 (quote); Pahlow, 1932, p. 582; Hughes, p. 428; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 475; 
Ellis & Esler, p. 403. 
29 Pahlow, 1932, p. 584; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, p. 100, 102; Becker et al., p. 515; Habberton & Roth, 
pp. 450, 460; Roehm et al., pp. 200, 247; Cox et al., p. 511; Holt & O’Connor, p. 275; Hanes (ed.), p. 464; 
Farah & Karls, p. 662.
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a “re actionary” and a “pro gressive” part of the English-speaking world.30 
The American Revolu tion is called a great leap forward in the de velopment 
of democracy and a model to the rest of the world. It inspired the French 
revolu tionaries a few years later and the liberation of the Spanish colonies 
in Ame rica in the early 19th century. In the historical master narrative of the 
text books, it was more or less a logical next step in the advent of a modern 
and democratic so ciety. It demonstrated to Europeans, and eventu ally also 
to other colonists around the world, that Enlightenment ideas could be put 
into practice:31 “This war, from an American view point, gave us freedom 
and independence. Equally important, from a world viewpoint, it gave the 
cause of constitu tional government a powerful boost.”32 Albeit the Revolu-
tion marks America’s separation from Europe, it transforms the USA into 
a role model for the Old World, assigning it a spiri tual mis sion in relation 
to Europe.
Relative isolation from Europe: 1783-1917
Still, the USA is free of direct European entanglements after the Revolu-
tion. During the 19th cen tury, few encounters between Europe and America 
are related, although the War of 1812, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Span-
ish-American War are mentioned by some. Ameri can so ciety was further 
democratized, and the Civil War secured this democracy, contrary to the 
hopes of the European aristocracy. The Monroe Doctrine and the war with 
Spain are ex plain ed by those who mention them by a wish to protect the 
Americas from European intru sions.33 It is maintain ed, by the older books 
in particular, that the young new na tion gave birth to ar tists, writers and 
scientists fully up to European stan dards. Where European writers, artists, 
com po sers, scientists and scholars are mentioned, there is often also ample 
30 Webster, p. 337; Pahlow, 1932, p. 584, and 1949, p. 418; Hughes, p. 428; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 
98, 101f; Smith et al., pp. 266, 291-293; Habberton & Roth, pp. 307-309; Platt & Drummond, pp. 308, 
312-316; Cox et al., p. 361; Holt & O’Connor, p. 276; Ellis & Esler, p. 469; Hanes (ed.), p. 363; Farah & 
Karls, p. 547. 
31 Webster, p. 340; Hughes, pp. 433, 436; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, p. 103; Roehm et al., p. 249; Cox, p. 
515; Holt & O’Connor, p. 277; Roselle, p. 364; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 479; Hanes (ed.), p. 469; Farah 
& Karls, p. 555.
32 Habberton & Roth, p. 309.
33 Robinson & Smith, p. 325, 480; Wallbank & Taylor, p. 228; Becker et al., pp. 467-469, 472f, 515, 519-521, 
572; Smith et al., pp. 479-481; Habberton & Roth, pp. 450-453, 457, 460-463; Farah & Karls, pp. 662, 722. 
Re garding the Spanish-American war, however, Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 587, also mention American 
business interests on Cuba.
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space devoted to their American counterparts, whose qualities are pointed 
out as well. In some cases, European prai se of American accomplishments 
is referred to: “Think of this when you are tempted to speak of America as 
young, and help her to be her age.”34 Perhaps it is the tradition al Euro pean 
con descen sion towards American culture that is countered when the cul-
tural ma turity of the Ame rican nation is established. The tendency amongst 
American “plutocrats” of the late 19th cen tury to try to imitate and emulate 
European high culture is deplored and some what ridiculed as in dicating a 
want of independen ce and a failure to realize the true worth of Ame ri ca’s 
own cul ture.35 In the newer books, the need to defend American culture 
seems less app arent, perhaps due to greater self-confidence in this field. 
The First World War: America Intervenes Directly in Europe
The First World War means that the USA becomes directly involved in Eu-
ropean affairs. The American entrance into the war in 1917 is explained by 
German violations of Ame rican neu trality through its submarine warfare, 
the Zimmermann Telegram, and an American perception of autocratic Ger-
many as a grave threat to democracy in Europe. Some mention the impact of 
allied war propaganda as well. President Wilson’s statement about making 
“the world safe for democracy” is quoted nearly everywhere. Al though the 
thesis, advanced in the interwar years, that influential arms manufacturers 
and other business men manipulated the USA into the war is mentioned by a 
few, none puts much credit to it. Ameri can motives were mainly unsel fish.36
American troops decided the outcome of the war, and President Wil-
son tried, through his idea of the League of Nations, to establish a more 
equitable world order, based on collective security to maintain peace, to 
replace European-style secret diplomacy and balance-of-power policies. 
Most books treat Wilson as a visionary, a “world-minded” man capable 
of looking farther than narrow national interests. His popularity with the 
war-weary masses of Europe is pointed out. The rejection of the League 
of Nations and the Versailles Treaty by the U.S. Sena te is lamented as a 
34 Pahlow, 1932, p. 628. See also e.g. Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 490f, 507; Becker et al., p. 465.
35 Pahlow, 1932, p. 628, 706; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 140f. 
36 Elson, p. 676; Pahlow, 1932, pp. 780f, and 1949, pp. 678f; Robinson & Smith, pp. 538-541; Hughes, pp. 
728f; Rogers et al., 1940, p. 682, and 1960, p. 714; Wallbank & Taylor, pp. 306-308; Becker et al., p. 703f; 
Smith et al., pp. 533f; Habberton & Roth, pp. 565-568; Platt & Drummond, pp. 542f; Roehm et al., p. 443; 
Holt & O’Connor, pp. 461f; Roselle, pp. 508f; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, pp. 632, 634; Ellis & Esler, pp. 
708, 710; Hanes (ed.), pp. 610-612; Farah & Karls, p. 751.
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manifestation of short-sightedness and parochialism. The textbooks do not 
support the American isolationism of the interwar era. Even before the Se-
cond World War, they tend to dissociate themselves from the idea that the 
U.S. should stay out of European af fairs altogether. After the Second World 
War, isolationism stands out even more as a mis take.37
The Interwar Years: America’s Unfortunate Retreat
As said above, it is generally deplored in the books that the USA withdrew 
from binding in ternational agreements and engagements after the First 
World War. The issue of the Allied war debts to the USA is treated so as 
to acknowledge some merit in both the American and the Franco-British 
standpoints: America was not wrong in its insistence that the debts be paid, 
but it might well have dealt with its debtors in a more generous fashion.38
With the emergence of totalitarian dictatorships in Europe, the affinity of 
the Western democracies—the USA, Great Britain, and France—becomes a 
more important feature. Text books written before the Second World War do, 
however, not regard Italian Fascism or So viet Commu nism as totally devoid 
of value, though they tend to see them as inferior to Wes tern democra cy. 
During and after the war, the attitude towards totalitarian ideologies and so-
cieties grows more negative.39 German Nazism and Soviet Communism are 
partly explain ed by the auto cratic and statist traditions of the two countries, 
making totalitarianism to a cer tain extent a continuation of an older Euro-
pean society with which Britain and, above all, the USA repre sent a break.40 
Again, the USA is the champion of democracy, and American isola tio nism 
37 Elson, p. 685f, 690-692; Pahlow, 1932, pp. 781f, 791-793; Robinson & Smith, pp. 557f; Hughes, pp. 
736-738; Rogers et al., 1940, p. 687, and 1960, pp. 715-717, 721; Wallbank & Taylor, p. 325; Smith et al., 
pp. 507, 538-540, 543-547; Habberton & Roth, pp. 571-574, 581, 593f; Platt & Drummond, pp. 545-548; 
Roehm et al., p. 447; Cox et al., pp. 597-599; Roselle, pp. 511f; Hanes (ed.), pp. 612-615, 619; Farah & 
Karls, pp. 761, 763.
38 Pahlow, 1932, pp. 802-804, and 1949, p. 675; Wallbank & Taylor, p. 337; Smith et al., p. 576; Habberton 
& Roth, pp. 612f; Roehm et al., pp. 460f. 
39 Elson, p. 604; Pahlow, 1932, p. 817f, 820f, and 1949, pp. 665, 671-673; Hughes, pp. 776, 795; Rogers et 
al., 1940, pp. 508f, 726-728, and 1960, pp. 541-547; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 346-348, 354-361; 
Becker et al., pp. 742-746; Smith et al., pp. 596-600; Habberton & Roth, pp. 569, 616-621; Platt & Drum-
mond, pp. 555-600; Roehm et al., pp. 483-494; Holt & O’Connor, pp. 481-483, 488, 498f; Roselle, pp. 
519-528; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, pp. 650-657, 691-697; Ellis & Esler, pp. 729-732, 775-780; Hanes (ed.), 
pp. 628f, 645f; Farah & Karls, pp. 782f, 789-791.
40 Elson, p. 710; Robinson & Smith, p. 619; Rogers et al., 1940, pp. 445, 457, and 1960, pp. 460, 476; Wall-
bank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 365; Platt & Drummond, p. 568; Roehm et al., p. 483; Holt & O’Connor, pp. 
351; Ellis & Esler, pp. 723f; Farah & Karls, p. 783.
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de nies the realities of the modern era; America can no longer ignore the rest 
of the world. With the stress on the common democracy of the USA, Great 
Britain and France, America is no longer separate from Western Europe, 
but they form a demo cratic West, both before and after the war. Not surpris-
ingly, this is seen most clearly, though not exclusi vely, in books published 
during and after the war.41
The Second World War: America Intervenes Again
It is made clear that from the outset of the war the great majority of Ameri-
cans sympathized with the Allies against Germany. Gradually, public opin-
ion in America also came to realize that it had to interfere in the war so as 
not to become isolated in a hostile totalitarian world. Several books quote 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s words on the USA as the “arsenal of democra cy”. 
The Atlantic Charter from 1940 is presented extensively and compared to 
Wilson’s Four teen Points. As in the First World War, America went to war 
in order to defend democracy.42 More than World War I, World War II is 
perceived as a struggle for the very civilization of the West, where the Nazis 
challenged the foundations of modern democratic Western socie ty.43
The Cold War
After the Second World War, Americans finally assumed the responsibility 
of a leading role in the world, following the decline of European power 
in the world. American international ism is justified by the necessity of 
countering the threat from the Soviet Union and commu nism. The Tru-
man Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are mentioned as important divides in 
America’s rela tionship with Europe and the world. American sponsorship 
of the United Na tions is em phasi zed, and American support for European 
inte gration is also explained by its significance for the security of the USA 
and of the democratic world. Textbooks from the days of the Cold War 
stress its character of a conflict between va lues, with the United States and 
41 Robinson & Smith, p. 325; Rogers et al., 1940, p. 687; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, p. 456; Becker et al., p. 
801; Smith et al., p. 507; Habberton & Roth, p. 594; Platt & Drummond, p. 542; Holt & O’Connor, p. 333; 
Ellis & Esler, p. 606; Hanes (ed.), p. 619. 
42 Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 454-458; Pahlow, 1949, pp. 678f, 697f; Becker et al., pp. 779f; Smith et 
al., pp. 645f; Habberton & Roth, pp. 682f, 694; Platt & Drummond, pp. 615, 633; Rogers et al., 1960, pp. 
736-739; Roehm et al., pp. 537f; Roselle, pp. 550-552. 
43 Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, pp. 436, 472; Becker et al., p. 803. Smith et al., p. 627; Habberton & Roth, p. 
636. 
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the Western European nations standing for freedom and de mocracy and the 
Soviet bloc standing for totali tarianism. It is seen as a continuation of the 
fight for democracy and against totalitarianism. American moderation in 
its support of colonized peoples’ struggles for inde penden ce is ex plained 
by the need to support America’s allies in the Cold War. In cases where 
West Euro pean states have pursued policies divergent from or even op-
posed to the American ones, this is viewed with suspi cion. The end of the 
Cold War means a great victory for demo cracy and hence for American 
values.44
Concluding Remarks
The books published after the end of the Cold War that I have looked at are 
not certain about the new direction of the world but express hopes for the 
eventual global victory of democracy and human rights.45 This development 
is essentially what the textbooks exam i ned here have believed in ever since 
1921. As mentioned above, the common thread running through basically 
all the books is a narrative of the evolution of democracy, beginning in 
me dieval England (with an impor tant forerunner in ancient Athens) and 
culmi nating in the Uni ted States, with the Ameri can constitution of 1789 
and further democratic developments in this country. The goal of history is 
understood to be the triumph of democracy and the Enlighten ment ideals 
over the older feudal or der, in Europe and in the rest of the world. Although 
the USA takes relati vely little part in world history before the 20th century, 
from the time it comes into exis tence it pro vides the world with an example 
to be inspired by. It stands apart from monar chical and un democratic Eu-
rope but is yet a part of Western civilization, by virtue of its Anglo-Saxon 
heri tage and its mostly European-descended population.
Although our pattern of culture is largely derived from Europe, in many details it is quite 
different from the original product. Millions of people with varying national cultures, 
from Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, England, Germany, France, and many others, 
have been poured into the American melting pot. […] The end-product was European 
in essence, but because different blends of European culture were included and because 
44 Pahlow, 1949, pp. 779f; Becker et al., pp. 6, 801, 832; Smith et al., pp. 706f, 712f; Habberton & Roth, 
p. 763; Platt & Drummond, p. 653, 659, 687; Rogers et al., 1960, p. 762, 768; Cox et al., p. 609; Holt & 
O’Connor, pp. 549-551, 560-563, 568; Roselle, pp. 565-569, 574; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, pp. 741-747, 
859f; Ellis & Esler, pp. 852, 855; Hanes (ed.), pp. 718-721, 726f; Farah & Karls, pp. 865, 868-871, 881. 
45 Ellis & Esler, p. 860; Hanes (ed.), pp. 844f; Farah & Karls, p. 1022. 
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they were shifted to an environment foreign to Europe, the new strain was far from being 
a replica of the European pattern. It had become American.46
Europe is both same and other in relation to the USA. With the gradual 
spread of democracy after the French Revolution, the world wars and fi-
nally the end of the Cold War, Europe grows more and more ‘same’ and less 
and less ‘other’ vis-à-vis the USA. The West as a cul tural and ideological 
concept in the textbooks is a negation of what Europe was in the past, be-
fore the 20th century or, in the case of Eastern Europe, before 1990. Being 
so close to Euro pe in many re spects, America has shown the Old World the 
road it should take. Britain is also still its closest companion on this path:
The United States and Britain are two very important democratic countries in the world 
to day. The governments of most other nations are based on the government of one or the 
other. If we know how the British and United States governments work, therefore, we can 
understand the governments of almost all free nations.47
It would be wrong, therefore, to state that an American identity is estab-
lished simply by posi ting Europe as America’s ‘other.’ Rather, American 
identity is constructed in conjunction with a Wes tern identity, based pri-
marily on British political and cultural conditions. The French Re volu tion 
is also applauded as a younger sibling of the American one and as the for-
ce starting the spread of democratic trends over continental Euro pe. Some 
textbooks underline the commo nality of American and French revolution-
ary ideals and the bonds be tween the USA and France through these shared 
ideals.48 At the same time, however, the stress which several books place 
on the influence of the frontier on American history and society is a means 
of distinguishing the American from the European. American cultu re and 
society is held to have been more egalita rian and libertarian than European 
civilization. It is also the country which first puts the En lightenment ideas 
into practice and shows that they are work able. There is some tension here 
between sameness and otherness in relation to Europe. 
American interventions in Europe in the 20th century, beginning with the 
First World War and continuing with the Second World War and the Cold 
46 Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, p. 221.
47 Holt & O’Connor, p. 323. 
48 Rogers et al., 1940, pp. 369f, and 1960, pp. 332, 361; Becker et al., p. 464; Habberton & Roth, p. 334; 
Roehm et al., p. 249; Roselle, p. 364; Hanes (ed.), p. 469. 
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War, also attest to U.S. commitment to democracy. The two world wars 
prompted the USA to defend democracy in Western Eu rope against its foes, 
thereby precipitating the development towards democracy in the other parts 
of Europe, where it had not yet taken hold. Thanks to the Ameri can contri-
butions, demo cratic government has expanded forcefully in the 1900s. 
Thus, the role of the USA has been first to implement and consummate 
European democratic ideals and then to help them to spread over Europe 
and the rest of the world. The Americans have in herited their valuable 
democratic political tradition from the English, but, they assert, it is the 
Americans who have administered this tradition best, by achieving a greater 
measure of social equality than Great Britain. This difference is less empha-
sized after the Second World War, though. American efforts have also been 
crucial to the defence of demo cracy against the threats posed by European 
autocracy and totalitarianism. At least in part, Eu rope must be transformed 
after the American image so as to become free and pros perous.
The USA is not necessarily superior to Europe on all accounts. Several 
textbooks admire European social welfare legislation and consider it wor-
thy of American emulation. The Scan dinavian “middle way” between pure 
capitalism and socialism by means of a welfare state gets good press. The 
USA is seen as lagging behind in this area, albeit Roosevelt’s New Deal 
is a major step in the right direction. From the 1930s to the 1980s, some 
government regula tion of the econo my is regar ded as beneficial, though 
none of the textbooks express any pre ference for social ism but ra ther are 
critical of Marxism.49 Still, from the 1980s, there appe ars to take place a 
certain change towards a more ambivalent or reserved attitude towards the 
Eu ropean welfare state, whose viability in the new globalized world may 
be in doubt.50
A comparison of the image of the American role in relation to Europe 
in 1921 with the image in 2001 reveals relatively little change. Of course, 
the growing attention given to the world outside Europe in the last third of 
the period studied is a significant change, but so far as American-European 
relations go, most elements remain the same, as well as the assessment of 
them. The English heritage is of great importance, the American Revolu-
49 Elson, p. 577, 604; Wallbank & Taylor, vol. II, p. 382f; Pahlow, 1949, p. 541; Becker et al., p. 551, 575; 
Smith et al., p. 366; Habberton & Roth, p. 632; Rogers et al., 1960, pp. 493-497; Platt & Drummond, p. 
492; Roehm et al., pp. 364f; Roselle, p. 575. 
50 Roselle, p. 575; Krieger, Neill & Jantzen, p. 751; Ellis & Esler, p. 850; Hanes, pp. 845-847. 
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tion is a model to the world, and American participation in the world wars 
and the Cold War is a blessing to Europe and the world. Textbooks have 
fairly consistently favoured internationalism over iso lationism, at least in 
the 20th century. Yet, there are some changes taking place between 1921 
and 2001, but they are not clear-cut. If anything, American self-confidence 
seems to grow over time, as the totalitarian regimes in Europe fall and the 
Western European welfare state en counters increasing difficulties toward 
the end of the 20th century. By the end of the period, there appears to be less 
need to defend American culture against European pretensions. It may be 
that the lesse ning of the social critique of Great Britain has so mething to 
do with a stronger emphasis on the commonalities of the West, especially 
in the Cold War era. As Europe beco mes less ‘other,’ the Western identity 
becomes more salient. 
The view of Europe as part of a “free West” but still struggling with a 
heritage of authori tarianism, statism and totalitarianism may be a founda-
tion of some of the American criticism of ‘Old Euro pe’ in the debate follow-
ing September 11, 2001, for condoning dictatorships and for en croaching 
on the free market by means of government regulation and bureaucracy. It 
has been pointed out that in this debate the USA has moved from its histori-
cal position urging a world order based on collective se curity to defending 
the independence of the nation-state, whilst Europe has mo ved in the other 
direction. But there is also a degree of con tinuity with an already prevail ing 
interpretation of Europe’s past. Some American critics have even war ned 
that the strife between the USA and Europe poses a threat to the survival of 
Western ci vilization. As in the past, this split between the United States and 
Europe is due to the latter’s penchant for unde mocratic ways.51 As was said 
in the beginning of this article, it has been common place amongst those de-
fending the policies of the Bush administration to brand oppositional West-
ern Europeans as ungrateful, which does not seem strange in view of the 
positive picture drawn of American interven tions in Europe in the textbooks 
examined here. There is still su spicion in the United States of a Euro pe 
which does not follow the Ame rican lead.
51 Russell E. Berman, Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Phenomenon, Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2004, pp. 10f, 48-51, 78f, 84f; James Ceaser, “The Philosophical Origins of Anti-Americanism in 
Europe”, in Paul Hollander (ed.), Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and 
Abroad, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004, p. 62. 
